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Invited Debate: Response 
Not All Effects Are Created Equal: A Rejoinder To Sawilowsky 
 
           J. Kyle Roberts         Robin K. Henson 
   University of North Texas  University of North Texas 
 
 
In the continuing debate over the use and utility of effect sizes, more discussion often helps to both clarify and 
syncretize methodological views. Here, further defense is given of Roberts & Henson (2002) in terms of 
measuring bias in Cohen’s d, and a rejoinder to Sawilowsky (2003) is presented. 
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Introduction 
 
Under a spirit of collegiality and zeal to further the 
field of research, dialogues like this play an 
important role in discussing areas where 
researchers both agree and disagree. Through 
open-ended dialogue, it is hoped that readers will 
continue to see the benefit in debate about 
important topics. 
 In this brief rejoinder to Sawilowsky 
(2003), we will provide discussion to the nine 
minor criticisms and one major criticism point by 
point. Although the first portion of his paper is 
lengthy, it does not bear comment on because it 
was expertly written and we do not disagree with 
any of the substance laid therein. 
 As we respond to each of the criticisms, 
however, we feel it important to note two things. 
First, the point of our paper was to show whether 
or not Cohen’s d contains any amount of bias and 
is therefore in need of a correction to account for 
this bias. 
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 For all practical purposes, our answer to 
this question was NO. As we stated in our article, 
“the amount of bias in d remained small under 
most conditions of consideration . . . [and the] 
incredibly small amount of difference between the 
population d and the average sample d leads us to 
believe that d is in fact not biased in terms of 
practical differences” (p. 247, 251). 
 Second, we examined Thompson’s (2002) 
proposed correction of d for accuracy and to see 
whether or not the correction was even necessary. 
In response to this proposed correction, we state, 
“although this correction of d seems to make sense 
theoretically, it overcorrects for the actual amount 
of bias” (p. 251). 
 As we begin our reply, we would like to 
note that NOWHERE in the rebuttal does 
Sawilwosky (2003) refute either of these findings. 
Instead, the arguments fall into two categories: 
minor criticisms that are mostly methodological, 
and one major criticism that has to do with the 
publishing of reported effect sizes. Once again, it 
bears mentioning that none of these criticisms, 
once having addressed and clarified the 
methodological issues, directly calls into suspect 
the findings of Roberts and Henson (2002). 
 
Responses to Minor Criticisms 
Criticism 1: Effect sizes help evaluate 
 Although we agree with Sawilowsky’s 
statement that effect sizes do not evaluate the 
effect of a difference or relationship, we want to 
note that we pointed out in our paper that the 
purpose of the effect size is to “help evaluate the 
magnitude of a difference” (emphasis ours, p. 
241); for judgments are of course made by people. 
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As Sawilowsky (2003) quoted this very statement, 
we do not see any point of disagreement here. 
 
Criticism 2: S-PLUS Random Number Generator 
 As Sawilowsky makes a good point about 
resetting the random number seed, it should be 
pointed out that this seed was reset for both 
populations so that they weren’t identical. 
Concerning the random number generator (RNG) 
in S-PLUS, however, we feel that the critic isms 
are unwarranted. The DIEHARD tests for 
randomness were designed to work on RNGs that 
assume 32 random bits. The RNG for S-PLUS is 
31 bit. As a result it should be assumed that the 
RNG will fail some of the tests that are 32 bit 
based. If there is a need for a 32 bit RNG, then S-
PLUS users can install a patch that will paste 
together 16 bits from each of two consecutive 
numbers and then the S-PLUS RNG will pass all 
of the DIEHARD tests. Also, the bug which 
Sawilowsky speaks of only applies to the Chi-
Square distribution function when X is large (e.g., 
10^13). (Our thanks to Tim Hesterberg from 
Insightful Corporation for his guidance concerning 
the RNG). 
 
Criticism 3: Typo!! 
 The entry of .0611 for the maximum r 2 
when d = .00 and n1=n2=10 in Table 2 should read 
.611. 
 
Criticism 4: Negative values for d 
 Although Sawilowsky (2003) disagrees, 
there are instances when a minimum d is actually 
less than zero. Consider the directional hypothesis 
t-test where we are comparing the effects of a diet 
pill on 100 people. We randomly assign people to 
one of two groups; experimental and control. The 
point of the study is to show the effect of the diet 
pill on the experimental group. Let’s suppose that 
when we compare the mean weights of the people 
at the beginning of the study and note that both 
group means are 200, and then again at the end of 
the study and note 225exp =X  and the 
200=controlX . If we were to consider that the s = 
35, then we could compute the d for this study as: 
 
 714.0
35
225200
-=
-
=d .  (1) 
  
Consider that it would be incorrect to interpret the 
absolute value of this formula (Cohen, 1988, 
formula 2.2.2) because we are witnessing an actual 
negative effect of the diet pill (e.g., people who 
took the diet pill actually gained weight). If we 
were to follow the logic of Sawilowsky, we would 
either interpret this as a positive effect or simply 
assume the effect is zero. In this case, interpreting 
a negative effect is important. It means that the 
diet pill worked worse than if we had done nothing 
at all! Sawilowsky also mistakenly states that the 
minimum effect (or d) should be defined as zero 
when in fact this is not true (c.f., Cohen, 1988, 
formula 2.2.1, p. 20). 
 As this formula applies to our study, we 
explicitly stated in our manuscript (p. 247) that the 
design of the study was to test this specific effect 
with a directional hypothesis where the expected 
effect was that the experimental group would have 
a larger mean in the population than did the 
control group (except for the case where d = .00). 
 
Criticism 5: Repetitions 
 Although Sawilowsky and Yoon (2001) 
used 10,000 replication, we felt that 5,000 was 
plenty to obtain generalizability. This was not a 
limitation due to using a macro in S-PLUS as S -
PLUS is a programming language and changing 
the number of replications is as simple as typing a 
new number into the script file. However, since 
Sawilowsky posited this as a criticism of the 
study, we re-ran all analysis with 10,000 
replications and noticed that even under extreme 
condit ions, estimates typically did not differ until 
the 1000th decimal place! 
 
Criticism 6: Sampling without replacement 
 We feel that we may have been 
misleading with our statement, “5,000 pairs of 
sample data were randomly drawn without 
replacement at the specified sample sizes” 
(Roberts & Henson, 2002, p. 246). What would 
have been better stated is that we sampled without 
replacement within  each given replication. After 
people were drawn from the population for the 
replication, they were then re-inserted into the 
population at the completion of that replication. 
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We chose this method because it seemed 
counterintuitive to allow for the inclusion of the 
same person twice within each study (although the 
probability for being chosen twice is less than 1% 
for n = 100). We should have been clearer in 
pointing out that we sampled with replacement 
across the replications, just not inside each 
replication. 
 
Criticism 7: Redundancy is reinforcement!! 
 Although Sawilowsky points out that there 
was no need for 2/3 of our study since there was 
no change in the standardized values, we felt it 
important to further reinforce the point that the 
spread of the data make simply a marginal 
difference in effecting the bias (or lack thereof) in 
both d and r2. We would argue that if the results 
really were redundant then we would see exactly 
the same values in each of the tables, which we in 
fact did not. Therefore the inclusion of all three 
tables serves to reinforce the point that under 
multiple conditions, d shows practically no bias. 
 
Criticism 8: Results that shouldn’t be published? 
 This criticism probably should have been 
labeled under the “major criticisms” because it 
states “there is little justification for publishing 
Monte Carlo work when results can be computed 
easily and directly.” As per our manuscript, we 
would again point out that the purpose of it was 
two-fold: to see if d contained bias and to see if 
Thompson’s (2002) correction formula should be 
applied. If nothing else than to show that 
Thompson’s formula “overcorrects for the actual 
amount of bias” (Roberts & Henson, 2002, p. 
251), then the manuscript has merit. Furthermore 
our study shows that even though the correction 
cited by Sawilowsky may apply to meta-analysis, 
it seems of little concern to attempt to correct d in 
directional hypothesis settings. 
 
Criticism 9: Compelling reasons to report effect 
sizes 
 We might restate that it was not the 
purpose of our study to present a “compelling 
reason to report effect sizes when the null 
hypothesis remains tenable.” Our purpose was to 
investigate the bias in d. However, having said that 
we would like to add that in any given study, we 
may obtain a result in which the null hypothesis is 
tenable, but that doesn’t mean that the effect is not 
real! We will deal more thoroughly with this in 
the next section. 
 
Response to Major Criticism 
Is the Effect Trivial or Not? 
Sawilowsky (2003) suggests that he and 
Yoon (2001) never “argued that small effects can 
in some cases be due solely to sampling error” as 
we summized (Roberts & Henson, 2002, p. 245). 
Nevertheless, in their paper Sawilowsky and Yoon 
(2001) noted that reporting their simulated average 
Cohen’s d effect of .17 would be “misleading 
because these effect sizes are specious” (p. 2). In 
their conclusion, the authors claimed: “It was 
shown that effect sizes should not be reported or 
interpreted in the absence of statistical 
significance” (Sawilowsky & Yoon, 2001, p. 4). 
(It should be noted as well that only the 
Sawilowsky & Yoon [2001] paper was referenced 
in our original article. Sawilowsky and Yoon’s 
2002 article resulting from this paper was not in 
print during our manuscript development, and 
therefore was not considered in our article.) 
 If Sawilowsky is not arguing that these 
effect sizes could be solely due to sampling error, 
then why not report and interpret them? Indeed, 
the average d of .17 was presented as a case when 
a non-zero effect was obtained from purely 
random numbers. Surely the logic of this 
conclusion suggests that small effects can be 
obtained even when the null hypothesis remains 
tenable under a statistical significance test. If the 
significance test is to be trusted over the small 
effect size, then from whence must the researcher 
conclude the effect originated? Under this logic, 
the effect must have been a function of sampling 
error. 
 
Confused vs Informed Methodology and 
Readership 
 Sawilowsky (2003) proceeds in his major 
criticism by presenting two literatures of effect 
sizes (A and B). He supposes that after reading 
one of these literatures, a reader may be 
“thoroughly confused on the effectiveness of the 
intervention” (p. 223) because of the presence of 
non-statistically significant results mixed with 
other, presumably, statistically significant results. 
We agree that interpretation of such a literature 
may present certain challenges. Nevertheless, we 
would be hopeful that a more informed use of 
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statistics would be the solution to this difficulty 
rather than avoidance of potential confusion by 
replacing it with another source of misleading 
information.  
(As a caveat, we would also be hopeful 
that even a modestly informed consumer of 
research would be able to determine the expected 
directionality of an effect, and whether the 
experimental group is expected to outperform or 
underperform the control on relevant outcomes. 
This assumes, perhaps, at least a modestly 
effective job at communication from the authors.) 
 It is at this point that we fundamentally 
disagree with Sawilowsky (2003). It is perhaps 
very appealing to some to employ statistical 
significance as a gatekeeper for reporting and 
interpreting meaningful outcomes. As we cited 
previously, Robinson and Levin (1997) and Levin 
and Robinson (2000) propose a reasoned argument 
for just such a two-stage process, where a finding 
must be deemed statistically significant before 
evaluation of the effect size is permitted. Of 
course, this would work only to the extent that the 
gatekeeper is effective in performing its duties. 
 This process also will only work when (a) 
the readership of the article understands fully the 
factors impacting statistical significance tests and 
the elements of power that underlie them and (b) 
the author understands and communicates these 
issues directly. Unfortunately, empirical studies 
have demonstrated that there are a great number of 
misconceptions about statistical significance 
testing (cf., Nelson, Rosenthal, Rosnow, 1986; 
Oakes, 1986; Rosenthal & Gaito, 1963; M. 
Zuckerman, Hodgins, A. Zuckerman, & 
Rosenthal, 1993), and so neither of these outcomes 
is likely on a widespread basis. Is this the 
method’s fault or our own? We would suggest, of 
course, primarily the latter. Unfortunately, 
statistical significance testing has come to be 
treated among many researchers as a truly 
dichotomous outcome that relates directly to result 
importance. This interpretation is a result of many 
factors, none of which make the misinterpretation 
any more correct. As Sawilowsky (2003) correctly 
indicated, the context of the study is critical when 
interpreting both statistical significance and effect 
size outcomes.  
 It is of course very true that a small effect 
size may be due to sampling error. It is also just as 
true that the same small effect size may be a real 
effect in spite of it not being statistically 
significant due to a lack of power. The arguments 
presented by Sawilowsky (2003) simply do not 
discount the possibility (and yes, historical truth) 
that some very real effects may exist but be at risk 
of not being discovered due to a lack of statistical 
significance. Meta-analytically speaking, however, 
when these small but non-statistically significant 
effects are examined across studies, a more 
meaningful outcome may be discovered. While it 
is very easy for methodologists to say that these 
studies should have had more power, it is much 
more difficult to attain sufficient power for every 
study in all applied situations. Should we pay 
more attention to power? Yes, of course. Should 
we also recognize that some small effects may 
indeed be reasonable outcomes not due entirely to 
sampling error? Absolutely! 
 A better approach to this issue, in our 
view, would not just result in discussion of 
whether statistical significance should be the 
gatekeeper, or even whether small effects should 
necessarily be reported and/or interpreted, but 
rather how methodologists and applied researchers 
can seek a more informed understanding and use 
of both of these statistics for what they are. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Effect sizes are not final determinants regarding 
whether a result is meaningful any more than 
statistical significance tests are, and if we interpret 
effect sizes with the same rigidity that we have 
historically interpreted statistical significance 
testing, we are guilty of committing the same error 
yet again. Instead, researchers ought to view their 
studies in context with prior literature, make 
comparisons between their outcomes and those 
from prior studies, attend to power issues, and 
interpret the findings to the readership for what 
they are. 
 Is a small yet non-statistically significant 
effect important? Maybe, maybe not. We certainly 
would not know for sure without replication and 
some form of meta-analysis. We certainly could 
not do either of these, at least in a world where 
Type II error exists as much as its Type I 
counterpart, unless these same small effects were 
reported.  
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